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ABSTRACT 
Symbols represent information we have previously learned or experienced, but they can 
also serve to encourage thoughts and behaviors that are consistent with this 
knowledge/experience in order to maintain social cohesion (Guthrie, 1996).  Pictures (e.g., 
American Red Cross image) representing moral rules (e.g., ‘save lives’) have been shown to in-
fluence moral decisions (Broeders, van den Box, Muller, & Ham, 2011), but there is no empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that religious pictures encourage the same outcome.  Four studies exam-
ined whether religious pictures would influence decision making (lexical, moral), and further-
more whether personal belief in religion was a moderating factor. In Study 1, participants viewed 
religious and neutral (control) pictures, and then made a series of lexical decisions (Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971).  In Study 2, participants viewed religious and neutral words (which repre-
sented the pictures viewed in Study 1), and then made lexical decisions.  In Studies 3 and 4, par-
ticipants made decisions about moral actions.  Moral decisions were preceded by viewing pic-
tures in Study 3, and by words in Study 4.  Self-reported religiosity was assessed last in each ex-
periment.  Across the four studies, we found support for the influence of religious pictures on 
decision making.  In Studies 1 and 2, lexical decisions were faster to religious words when 
primed with religious pictures.  In Study 3, participants rated morally ambiguous actions as less 
appropriate when primed with religious pictures.  This occurred to a greater degree for religious 
participants.  In Study 4, there was a general priming effect of religious words, but this was not 
influenced by individual religious beliefs.   
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1     INTRODUCTION 
Symbolic forms (e.g., language, pictures) are routes to representing knowledge.  These 
representations communicate thoughts, experiences and emotions, are adaptive to different con-
texts and cultures, and potentially are important aids for survival (Benjafield, 1992).  Pictures are 
unique because they synchronously represent information, that is, elements of an object or event.  
This information representation is useful as it then guides behavior.  Pictures, therefore, can be-
come icons which communicate an expected behavior (Benjafield, 1992; 2007).  For example, 
the American flag represents information like freedom and democracy (Ortner, 1973), and, argu-
ably, a host of information related to specific freedoms or affordances located within the bill of 
rights and the constitution.  Seeing the American flag may simply bring to mind your knowledge 
of democracy or it might encourage you to act or vote in a way that is consistent with your 
knowledge of what it means to be an “American.”  For a religious person in the Christian tradi-
tion, the crucifix may represent information related to the teachings of Jesus such as love, faith, 
and peace.  Importantly, the latter two image examples represent more than one semantic concept 
simultaneously.   The current set of studies will test whether religious pictures (e.g., crucifix, 
crown of thorns) concurrently prime religious knowledge, thus influencing decision mak-
ing. 
1.1 Picture Symbols 
Generally speaking, symbols represent information we have previously learned or experi-
enced, but they can also serve to encourage thoughts and behaviors that are consistent with this 
knowledge/experience in order to maintain social cohesion (Guthrie, 1996).  Carlston and Mae 
(2007) simultaneously presented trait-implying symbols (e.g., a picture of a rose implied the trait 
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‘romantic’) alongside a target individual and found that the target was later perceived as having 
the traits implied by the symbol.  The authors concluded that symbols, due to their ubiquitous 
nature, inform impression formation with and without intentionality of the observer.  Hassin, 
Ferguson, Shidlovski, and Gross (2007) conducted two studies and found that visual exposure to 
one’s national flag  influenced personal opinions on key political issues, such that right versus 
left wing Israeli participants converged on political opinions when primed with the Israeli flag 
relative to those primed with a control image.   
Geertz (1973) suggested that religion, a unifying set of beliefs and practices that create 
moral community (Durkheim, 1995), is further defined by its use of symbology, which activate 
long-term goals, in order to motivate people along a religious path, in part because symbols are 
culturally important and emotion-provoking (Ortner, 1973).  Baldwin, Carrell, and Lopez (1990) 
found that female Catholic participants who were primed with a picture of the Pope displaying a 
disapproving expression made lower self-evaluations than those who saw a disapproving expres-
sion on the picture of an unknown person.  In a series of two studies, Weisbuch-Remington, 
Mendes, Seery, and Blascovich (2005) further found that religious pictures influenced cardiovas-
cular responses when performing a subsequent task (i.e., giving a speech about visiting the den-
tist or one’s own death).  They found that participants exposed to a negative religious picture 
(i.e., demons) exhibited threat-like cardiovascular responses relative to those exposed to a posi-
tive religious picture (e.g., Christ ascending to heaven).   
Beyond beliefs and impressions, symbols have also been found to influence behavior. 
Bering (2006) and Bering, McLeod, and Shackelford (2005) found that priming supernatural ide-
as (e.g., “ghost”) influenced cheating behavior in three-year olds, as well as in college students.   
Joly and Stapel (2009) found that Dutch children who were primed with pictures associated St. 
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Nicholas (e.g., miter, staff, book) subsequently engaged in sharing behavior relative to children 
who were primed with a neutral picture.  Hassin and colleagues (2007) conducted a third study 
and found the response gap between right and left wing participants again merged when the Is-
raeli flag was presented, and influenced both voting intentions as well as voting behavior.  These 
data support arguments that the influence of pictures as symbols occurs automatically (Bargh, 
1994), and outside one’s conscious awareness (Guthrie, 1996).   
1.1.1  Picture Symbols and Moral Rules  
Broeders, van den Bos, Muller, and Ham (2011) examined whether exposing participants 
to picture symbols, representing moral rules, would facilitate responses consistent with those 
rules or not.  Moral rules, according to Looy (2004), are prescriptions of “good” and “bad”,  rep-
resenting the purpose of our human nature, and which fluctuate relative to location (e.g., history, 
culture, religion). Moral rules may have their origin in genetic expression, such that the replica-
tion of moral rules across social entities is primarily a reflection of our innate biology.   Others 
argue that moral rules are not bounded by biology, but that they are socially constructed, and 
contribute to the longevity of community (e.g., Haidt, 2001).  Broeders and colleagues (2011) 
had participants complete a small jigsaw puzzle that formed the American Red Cross logo (a 
symbol representing the moral rule “save lives”), the Peace logo (representing the rule “do not 
kill”), or a bicycle wheel (a neutral symbol not representative of any moral rule).  Then partici-
pants were presented with the classic footbridge problem scenario.  In this scenario, participants 
are told that a trolley is traveling down a set of tracks and cannot use its brakes.  In its unstoppa-
ble course it will kill five men working at the end of the tracks.  You are standing on a footbridge 
located above the tracks, and have the opportunity to prevent the five workmen from dying, but 
to do so you must push a man (who is standing next to you on the footbridge) onto the tracks.  
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His body will stop the trolley from killing the five workmen, but will kill him in the process.  In 
this scenario, the life of one person is placed in opposition to the lives of five others.  Broeders 
and colleagues found that participants reported a greater tendency to intervene in the situation if 
exposed to the “save lives” symbol relative to either the “do not kill” or neutral symbols.   
These data provide additional evidence that pictures are symbolically representative of 
information other than what is visible through the image features alone, and furthermore that 
they demonstrate the influence of picture symbols on decision making within a moral domain.  
Additionally, participants’ decisions were consistent with the rule represented, such that, partici-
pants intervened in the scenario to save the maximum number of lives when shown the “save 
lives” moral rule symbol.  What remains untested is whether religious symbols will have a 
similar influence on moral decision making.  Given that religion is viewed by some as the 
primary source for one’s moral education (e.g., Winchester, 2008), it follows then that reli-
gious pictures should prime the learned tenets of one’s faith, and thus influence moral 
judgments.  The current experiments will test this relationship. 
1.2 Pictures vs. Images 
According to dual-coding theory (Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991), there are alternate systems 
which represent sensory input: logogens and imagens.  Logogens are units that represent verbal 
input, whereas imagens are units that represent visual input.  Because language proceeds sequen-
tially, logogens correspond to sequential perception.  Conversely, because units of visual infor-
mation are presented simultaneously, imagens therefore are perceived simultaneously. Although 
imagens are internally produced (i.e., mental images), they are associated with external objects 
(or elements of external objects).  Mental images have been shown to facilitate learning (e.g., of 
word pairs) relative to verbal learning alone (Bower, 1970). According to Paivio (as cited in 
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Benjafield, 1992), imagery is the effortless production of an internal picture prompted from an 
external stimulus. Although produced differently, external visual stimuli (hereafter referred to as 
pictures) and internal imagery (hereafter referred to as images) are equally as effective at encour-
aging a desired outcome because their representations are functionally the same (as demonstrated 
by mental rotation studies), and both can guide overt behavior (Shepard, 1978; Shepard & 
Chipman, 1970).  Bower (1970) suggested that images are better remembered than words be-
cause they are more distinctive or because the relational encoding of the learned image/word 
stimulus is stored with more semantic connections in memory. Given the unique role of images 
in associative learning and memory, images thus become representative, or symbolic, of the ex-
periences (i.e., objects, events) to which they are associated (Paivio, 1969).  Furthermore, visual 
input (picture or image) is remembered better than verbal (words) (Roediger, 2008).   
Words can also be symbolic of related information and experience (Bower, 1972; Paivio, 
1969).  Concrete words (i.e., words that evoke an image), relative to abstract words (i.e., words 
that do not evoke an image), become meaningful because of their association to external objects 
or events, such that presentation of the word may eventually prompt the production of other as-
sociated verbal and visual items (Paivio, 1969).  These associations arguably lead to priming, 
whereby a concrete item might lead to the production of an abstract (but associated) item.  For 
example, the concrete word ‘church’ might prime the abstract word ‘religion’.  Under other cir-
cumstances, one modality could prompt the other – such that a concrete word may bring to mind 
an internal image, or an external picture may conjure its verbal marker.  Although pictures, and 
verbal markers of these pictures, can both be symbolic representations with regard to associated 
items, the influence of pictures has been demonstrated to be stronger (e.g., greater memory; 
Bower, 1972; Paivio, 1969) than words - even if those words are concrete.  In general, the order 
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of effectiveness begins with abstract items on the lower end, followed by concrete items, and is 
strongest for visual objects or pictures (Paivio, 1969). 
1.3 Priming 
The effectiveness of any symbol (picture or word) is directly related to one’s knowledge 
(i.e., memory) of the item and its associations.  Miller (2009) argued that memory is a founda-
tional element of religion, and seemingly a person could not engage in a religious ritual (e.g., 
baptism, eucharist) without first knowing and remembering the ritual procedure, or apply reli-
gious doctrine to personal circumstances, if they have not learned and understood the tenets.  
Thus, it has been argued that religion forms and maintains a moral community, and guides the 
construction of our moral selves (Winchester, 2008).  The current set of studies test whether 
religious symbols (pictures, words) bring to mind (i.e., prime) related associations in 
memory, and thus guide moral decisions. 
Priming occurs by presenting a stimulus which then facilitates access to other semantical-
ly related content (Benjafield, 2007; Schacter, 1987; Tulving & Schacter, 1990).  If conducted in 
the confines of a specific task, then the priming stimulus should encourage a semantically related 
response.  Priming has been shown to impact thought processes, decisions, behaviors, or a com-
bination of these (e.g., Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990; Jacoby & Kelley, 1992; Kelley & Jacoby, 
2000).  In a traditional priming experiment, a set of stimuli (e.g., words, names) are presented 
first.  Then, a recognition task is performed wherein the previously presented stimuli are shown 
along with previously unseen (or new) stimuli.  If more previously seen stimuli items are recog-
nized relative to the unseen items, then priming is said to have occurred (Tulving & Schacter, 
1990).  Jacoby and Hollingshead (1990) found that exposing participants to misspelled words 
increased the likelihood of unintentionally misspelling those words when required to correctly 
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reproduce a series of audio presented words at test.  Other examples of priming tasks fall into 
two categories: perceptual and conceptual.  Examples of perceptual tests include lexical deci-
sions (wherein people perform word/nonword judgments; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971), word 
completion tasks (i.e., having studied the word PYRAMID, and then shown the fragment ‘-Y-A-
ID’ at test), identification of perceptually degraded words, as well as recall and recognition 
memory tests.  An example of a conceptual test would include category-associations where one 
is given the name of a category (e.g., ‘bird’) and told to identify the first item that comes to mind 
that is associated with that category (e.g., ‘eagle’).  
Associative priming occurs when seeing one word (‘doctor’) leads to an increase in pro-
ducing a different but related word (‘nurse’).  This is different than typical priming examples 
discussed previously, because here the concern is not whether previous exposure to ‘doctor’ will 
lead to faster identification of ‘doctor’ on a recognition task.  Instead, the interest is in the asso-
ciative relationship between words and concepts.  Thus, the amount of priming produced is di-
rectly related to one’s knowledge of the relationship between two or more items (McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1992).   
According to spreading activation theories, the success of this type of priming is based on 
the interconnected relationship between the two words (Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Quillian, 1967), such that ‘doctor’ will only lead to production or 
recognition of ‘nurse’ as a function of their previously associated memory traces.  Thus, unrelat-
ed words (neutral or foil words; e.g., ‘bread’) would not be identified when ‘doctor’ is shown in 
the same way ‘nurse’ would be identified.  The neutral or foil words would also not produce dif-
ferent response frequencies from one another when primed with ‘doctor’.   
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According to non-spreading activation (e.g., compound cue) theories, associative priming 
is based on a matched cue search in memory (Dosher & Rosedale, 1989; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
1988), such that the relationship between ‘doctor’ and ‘nurse’ is based primarily on the familiari-
ty of the stimulus pair.  By this account then, ‘doctor’ could arguably prime ‘bread’ if the ‘doc-
tor-bread’ pairing was a frequently occurring, and thus familiar, cue.  Therefore, it is more likely 
that neutral or foil words could be identified when primed with a stimulus word than they would 
according to spreading activation theories.   Associative priming has been endorsed in both lexi-
cal decision and item recognition tasks, as well as in judgment of spatial locations (McNamara, 
1992). 
Associative priming extends beyond simple word identification.  Priming participants 
with well-known information about a social group (e.g., trait, stereotype) has been shown to in-
crease the likelihood of expressing related behaviors (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).  In a classic 
study, Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996) primed participants with neutral words or with stereo-
typical words characteristic of elderly people (e.g., old, bingo). They found that participants who 
viewed the stereotypical words walked significantly slower when exiting the laboratory than 
those who viewed the neutral words, suggesting that the words activated associated information 
about elderly people (they walk slow) leading to behavior consistent with that information (to 
walk slowly themselves).   Moreover, priming ‘elderly’ has also been shown to decrease perfor-
mance on a memory task (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000).  Along a simi-
lar theoretical framework, priming ‘politician’ (versus a no prime condition) led participants to 
be more long-winded when constructing essays (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 2000), and 
priming ‘professor’ increased correct responses on a test of general knowledge (Dijksterhuis & 
van Knippenberg, 1998).   
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1.4 Religion 
Recent research has demonstrated priming within the context of religious information 
(e.g., Wenger, 2003; Wenger & Daniels, 2006). Once accessed, this religious knowledge net-
work has been shown to influence comprehension, memory for past events, and judgments.  For 
example, Lipson (1983) found that children had greater comprehension of religious texts if they 
had prior knowledge of the information they were asked to read.  Wenger (2003) primed reli-
gious participants with religious words (or nonwords), and then asked them to list the three 
greatest historical events.  He found that participants listed more biblical events when primed 
with religious words.  Using the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), other researchers have found implicit associations for religious (Wenger & Daniels, 
2006), as well as moral concepts (Hoverd & Sibley, 2007).   
These associations can be grounded in physical processes (e.g., vision, audition) and are 
in this sense embodied (McCauley & Whitehouse, 2005). Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, and 
Schjeldahl (2007) provided evidence for the embodiment of religious information when they 
found that metaphorical representations of God are associated with upward movement, and met-
aphorical representations of the devil are associated with downward movement.  Other associa-
tions may represent habits (Miller, 2009) or rituals repeatedly performed, which then leads to a 
perseverance of both the associations themselves, as well as the contextual and emotional sali-
ence in which the original (and repeated) associations are performed (McCauley & Whitehouse, 
2005).  It follows then that if a person references images or icons of their faith, be it a cross on 
their necklace or a mezuzah in the doorway of their home, and reference it whenever they are 
facing a difficult life event, then the association between variable life circumstances and the 
teachings of their faith are strengthened.   
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Furthermore, the tendency to reach out towards one’s faith must be learned initially, and 
would be the result of a recollective memory process whereby a person intentionally remembers 
that they are a spiritual person who engages in spiritual practices, and then applies them willful-
ly.  All of which require resources of attention (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980).  
Over time, reaching towards one’s faith may be the result of familiarity, such that repeated expo-
sure to faith practices or rituals have created well-worn cognitive pathways related to the me-
chanics of the practice and to the situations in which engaging in that practice is applied.  Thus, 
when a situation is encountered an automatic response of applying faith practices may follow.  It 
follows then, that for a religious person, the automaticity of relying on one’s faith does not re-
quire intention (i.e., attentional resources), and is strengthened by the frequency with which a 
person makes the association.  Therefore, if a person can look to their faith under any circum-
stances, then every time they do so they are activating a network of stored information related to 
these teachings.   If religious beliefs influence the strength of associative nodes regarding 
religious information (i.e., religious-type information is more familiar for religious per-
sons), then will religious pictures prime this network, and will this primed network influ-
ence general judgments (e.g., lexical decisions) as well as moral judgments? 
1.4.1 Religion and Morality 
Memory necessitates the confines with which we regulate ourselves across contexts and 
communities (Miller, 2009).  For example, identifying oneself as a helpful person requires one to 
have engaged in helping behavior in the past or to feel that helping behavior is a prescribed tenet 
of some belief system. Although religion is arguably a primary catalyst to moral identity for-
mation (e.g., Winchester, 2008), the relationship between religion and morality is empirically 
tenuous.  Religious concepts, as well as personal religiosity have been shown to influence social-
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ly appropriate behavior in some studies, whereas others have found divergent evidence.  Ahmed 
and Salas (2011) primed participants with religious words, and then had participants complete 
the dictator and prisoner’s dilemma games.  They found that priming with religious words in-
creased generosity and cooperation across both tasks.  Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) found that 
priming of God concepts influenced the amount of money participants left for an unknown 
stranger, suggesting that God concepts may refer to “moral actors” and therefore influence be-
havior.  Randolph-Seng and Nielson (2007) found that priming participants with religious words 
negatively predicted cheating behavior in a prisoner’s dilemma game, that is, they were less like-
ly to cheat when primed with religious (versus sports or neutral) words.  Thus, religious primes 
again promoted positive behavior, (i.e., honesty).  Interestingly, these effects were not influenced 
by personal religiosity.   
Kohlberg and Power (1981) argued that religion and morality were two independent con-
structs.  Lombrozo (2009) had participants complete a moral commitments assessment followed 
by the trolley and footbridge problems.  Consequentialist participants (i.e., those who evaluate 
the acceptability of a behavior based on real or imagined outcomes) judged moral dilemmas as 
more permissible than deontologist participants (i.e., those who focus on the behavior rather than 
the possible outcomes).  These results were robust regardless of religiosity.  Fumagalli, et al. 
(2010) similarly found that individual religiosity did not impact the reaction time or frequency of 
utilitarian judgments to moral situations.  Conversely, religious beliefs in other studies have been 
found to influence general, as well as moral judgments. The influence of the disapproving Pope 
picture (Baldwin, et al., 1990) was only effective for participants who were active practicing 
Catholics, and the cardiovascular responses to negative religious pictures were only present for 
Christian (relative to non-Christian) participants (Weisbuch-Remington, et al., 2005).  Cohen and 
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Rozin (2001) found that participants who self-identified as Protestant (rather than Jewish) were 
less accepting of a character in a scenario if the character’s mental state was implicated in the 
moral rule violation.  Morewedge and Clear (2008) found that Christian participants judged vi-
gnettes (which violated religious doctrine) more morally wrong when they affirmed a belief in 
the concept of an anthropomorphic God.  Wahrman (1981) further found a moderated link be-
tween religion and morality, such that rigid adherence to religious doctrine resulted in lower 
moral judgment development.  As previous studies have found that picture symbols were 
representative of moral rules, such that these pictures primed moral decisions, the current 
experiments seek to further test the relationship between pictures and moral judgments 
using religious iconography. 
1.5 Overview of Studies 
Overall, it is hypothesized that repeated associations between religious pictures and reli-
gious information facilitate their application to life circumstances, not only as contemplative 
tools, but arguably as proscriptive guides to decisions and behavior.   Although the research is 
mixed as to whether religion informs morality at all, and if it does, then how it is informative – it 
is hypothesized that for religious persons, the repeated exposure to religious symbolism has cre-
ated an interconnected network of religious information.  Whereby anytime a religious symbol is 
seen, the full network of religious information becomes activated in memory, via spreading acti-
vation, and that this activated network influences one’s moral judgments.  Four experiments 
were conducted to explore this relationship.   
In Studies 1 and 2, religious pictures (S1) versus religious words (S2) were tested as ve-
hicles of activation for a network of religious information among religious (versus nonreligious) 
persons, with the prediction that activation will influence the speed of accurate word/non-word 
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identifications.  To test this, in Study 1, participants were primed with religious or control pic-
tures, and then completed a lexical decision task where words (religious, nonreligious) and 
nonwords were presented.   Participants identified the true words from the nonwords.  Accuracy 
and reaction time (RT) were recorded, and self-reported religiosity was assessed last. In Study 2, 
participants were primed with religious (versus control) words (half abstract, half concrete), and 
then completed a lexical decision task 
For Study 1, It was hypothesized that religious pictures would prime religious infor-
mation for religious persons via spreading activation of related nodes in memory.  Accordingly, 
it was predicted that RT to accurate lexical decisions should be faster when identifying religious 
relative to nonreligious words after being primed with religious pictures.  If personally held reli-
gious beliefs result in a heightened activation of religious information and thus influence deci-
sion making based on experienced semantic knowledge activation, then RTs should be faster for 
religious than nonreligious participants.  For Study 2, and in line with the data cited from the im-
agery literature, the concrete religious words should lead to RT patterns similar to those observed 
in Study 1, as concrete words (which conjure a mental image of the object being described) are 
functionally similar to actually seeing the object.  Abstract prime words should not do this.  Ab-
stract words were used as a control group, therefore no specific predictions are outlined.  When 
comparing the priming effect of pictures (S1) versus words (S2), pictures should more efficiently 
prime related religious concepts than words, thereby leading to faster RT although the direction 
of the data pattern should be in similar, i.e., participants should have faster RTs to religious 
words when primed with religious pictures relative to each of the control groups. 
In Studies 3 and 4, the influence of religious pictures (S3) versus religious words (S4) on 
moral judgments was tested.  In Study 3, participants were primed with pictures (religious, con-
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trol), similar to Study 1, and then they made moral judgments to short action phrases (morally 
right, morally wrong, morally ambiguous).  In Study 4, participants were primed with words (re-
ligious, control), and then made moral judgments.  Following predictions outlined in Studies 1 
and 2, in Study 3 religious pictures should activate semantic religious information thereby influ-
encing moral judgments to ambiguous action phrases, as these actions are necessarily uncertain 
without additional contextual information.  If individual religious beliefs increase the strength of 
knowledge pathways due to repeated and frequent use, then for ambiguous phrases, religious 
(versus nonreligious) persons should rate ambiguous actions are less appropriate, because decid-
ing to apply religious proscription of moral behavior will arguably dominate judgment delibera-
tion.  If belief systems do not matter, then religious and nonreligious participants alike should 
demonstrate a similar overall priming effect of religious pictures on moral judgments such that 
ratings  of moral appropriateness should decrease relative to when a control picture is primed.  
Morally right and wrong action phrases should not be influenced by symbol type (pictures, 
words), prime type (religious, control) or participant religiosity (religious, nonreligious), because 
moral decisions to these actions should be relatively certain regardless of other factors. 
In Study 4, concrete religious words should mirror the priming effect of religious pic-
tures, i.e., moral ratings of appropriateness should be lower when primed with a religious (versus 
control) word, although when compared to the priming of pictures in Study 3, then the superiori-
ty of pictures should emerge.  Moral judgments should be lower when primed with a religious 
picture versus a religious word.   
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2     PILOT STUDY – SELECTION OF PICTURES AND WORDS 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
Undergraduate students at GSU (N=49) were recruited for this study using the GSU Psy-
chology Research, Testing and Tutoring site (http://gsu.sona-systems.com).  Participants self-
identified their gender (41 female, 8 male), race (15 White, 25 Black, 9 other race), age (range 
18-50 years), and religion (33 Christian, 8 other religion, 4 agnostic, 4 religion not identified).  
Students voluntarily participated for course credit.   
2.1.2 Materials 
Pictures. Religious pictures were taken from internet searches, and were reformatted for 
size and color consistency. Christian pictures (n=9) were included (e.g., crucifix, crown of 
thorns).  Control pictures (n=13) were chosen as neutral comparisons to the religious pictures.  
They include punctuation and editing characters (e.g., asterisk, at sign).  See Appendix A. 
Words. A list of 59 religious words (conceptual and concrete) were derived, and assessed 
for character length and frequency (at wordplay.geneseo.org).  Then, three nonreligious words 
were then selected based on their length and frequency match to each religious word (n=137).   
Legal nonwords were matched for length, and were adapted from McCann and Besner (1987).  
See Appendix B. 
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Religiosity1. 
Religious Fundamentalism Scale (RFS; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). The religious 
fundamentalism scale is a 12-item measure that assesses whether a person believes there is one 
fundamental set of teachings about the truths of humanity, as well as assessing one’s relationship 
to deity.  This measure has been shown to measure religious fundamentalism across faith tradi-
tions, and has high internal consistency (r=.80).   
2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants reviewed and signed consent forms, and then saw two blocks of materials 
(pictures, words) to be rated (blocks counterbalanced).  Religious and nonreligious items were 
randomized within each block.  Participants rated the degree to which each item is associated 
with religion/spirituality, how familiar the item is to them, and how positive/negative the item is 
(all Likert scales; 1=not at all, 7=very).  Next, participants answered a series of questions related 
to their religiosity (see Materials), and then provided demographic information.  Finally, partici-
pants were debriefed and awarded credit for participating. 
                                                          
1
 Participant religiosity was also measured by assessing frequency of religious behavior (e.g., 
praying) via Religious Background and Behavior Scale (RBB; Connors, Tonigan, & Miller, 
1996), and self-reported denomination (Christian, non-Christian).  In all studies reported here, 
the influence of religiosity on decisions (lexical, moral) was also examined using these alterna-
tive assessments of religiosity, but neither religious behavior nor denomination yielded any sig-
nificant influence on study outcomes therefore they are not discussed any further in the context 
of individual study results. 
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2.2 Results 
Average ratings of religiosity, familiarity, and valence were calculated for each picture 
and word.   As our participant sample was heavily Christian (67%), the five most spiritually-
associated Christian pictures the five least spiritually-related control pictures were selected (see 
Appendix A).  Pictures were equally familiar, Mrelig=6.47, Mcontrol=6.48, t(8)= -.01, p=.99, and 
equally valenced, Mrelig=5.37, Mcontrol=4.20, t(8)=2.01, p=.08, but religious pictures were rated as 
significantly more religious than control pictures, Mrelig=6.08, Mnonrelig=1.60, t(8)=28.29, p<.01.   
Sixty (20 religious, 20 nonreligious) words were selected for use in the experiments that 
follow (see Appendix B).  Independent t-tests revealed that religious and nonreligious words do 
not differ along familiarity (Mrelig=6.13, Mnonrelig=6.02, t(38)= -.87, p=.39) or valence 
(Mrelig=5.78, Mnonrelig=5.61, t(38)= -.78, p=.44) dimensions.  They only differ to the extent that 
they were rated as religious, Mrelig=6.00, Mnonrelig=4.55, t(38)= -5.50, p<.01.  
3     STUDY 1 – PICTURES AS SYMBOLS ON LEXICAL DECISIONS 
Overall, it was hypothesized that religious pictures would prime a network of religious 
information, and that this should be more pronounced for religious persons.  Several predictions 
follow.  First, and as a manipulation check, participants should be significantly faster and more 
accurate at identifying words (religious and nonreligious) versus nonwords.  Second, if religious 
beliefs matter in regard to spreading activation and subsequent decision making, then only reli-
gious participants should be faster than nonreligious participants to identify religious words 
when primed with a religious image.  Third, nonreligious participants should respond with 
equivalent speed to both word types (religious, nonreligious) and picture prime (religious, con-
trol). Evidence for Prediction 2 would demonstrate that all words are equally familiar, and that 
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activation is contingent upon religious belief.  Fourth, if religious beliefs are not influential, then 
there should be evidence of an overall priming effect of religious pictures on religious words, 
such that everyone identifies religious words faster than nonreligious words when primed with a 
religious versus control picture.  Fifth, control pictures should not prime responses to either word 
type therefore RTs when primed with control pictures serve as a neutral control condition.    
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Undergraduate students at GSU (N=102) were recruited for this study using the GSU 
Psychology Research, Testing and Tutoring site (http://gsu.sona-systems.com).  Participants self-
identified their gender (72 female, 27 male; 3 participants did not answer this question), race (23 
White, 44 Black, 35 other race), age (range 18 - 54 years; M=23.69 years), and religion (51 
Christian, 29 none/non-denominational, 10 other religion, 8 agnostic/atheist; 4 participants did 
not answer this question).  Students voluntarily participated for course credit.   
3.1.2 Materials 
Pictures. See Materials; Pilot Study.  See also Appendix A. 
Words. See Materials; Pilot Study.  See also Appendix B. 
Religiosity. See Materials; Pilot Study. 
3.1.3 Procedure 
After reviewing and signing consent forms participants completed a task consisting of 
two alternating goals, 1) attending to a presented picture on the computer screen, and 2) deter-
mining whether a string of letters formed a word or not (lexical decision task; Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971).  Religious or control pictures were presented in randomized block format.  
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Each block consisted of 30 trials, and each trial began with a picture (e.g., religious: crucifix) 
being shown first, followed by a letter string that formed a religious or nonreligious word or a 
nonword.  They were told to identify whether the letter string was a “word” or a “nonword” (via 
key press) as quickly and accurately as possible.   
A fixation point (+) was shown in the middle of the screen (300ms), followed by an im-
age (50ms).  Then a randomly presented letter string appeared and remained on the screen until a 
word/nonword decision was made.  The trial ended with an interstimulus interval (ISI; 300ms).  
There were five pictures used in each picture prime condition (religious, control), and each pic-
ture was shown 6 times for a total of 30 trials in each block.  The 30 trials included 10 religious 
words, 10 nonreligious words, 10 nonwords.   
Once all trials were completed participants were asked to write down all pictures they 
remembered seeing.  Then they answered a series of questions related to their religiosity (see 
Materials; Pilot Study), and they identified what they thought the experimental hypothesis was.  
Finally, participants were debriefed and awarded credit for participating. 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Design 
An overall 2x2x2 [Participant Religiosity: religious, nonreligious x Picture Prime: reli-
gious, control x Word Type: religious, nonreligious] mixed-subjects model was used.  Participant 
Religiosity was a between-groups variable, whereas Word Type and Picture Prime were within-
subjects.  The dependent variable was average RT to accurate lexical decisions.   
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3.2.2 Items Analysis 
The presence of outliers was evaluated by conducting items analyses of picture primes 
and words using average accuracy and reaction times as dependent measures.  Pictures or words 
falling outside two standard deviations around the mean for accuracy or reaction time (RT) were 
removed from the analyses that follow.  One control picture, six nonwords, and one nonreligious 
word were removed.  Participant outliers were also evaluated by examining accuracy and RT 
collapsed across the other IVs, but none were found consistently to fall outside the two standard 
deviation boundary for accuracy or RT.  The analyses that follow were all conducted with all 
outliers removed. 
3.2.3 Data Preparation 
Next, average RTs (accurate lexical decision) were calculated for each Word Type x Pic-
ture Prime.  Then, RFS scores were calculated for each participant.  Of the 12 items on RFS, half 
were reverse-scored.  The regular- and reverse-scored items were added up separately, then the 
sum of the reverse items was subtracted from the sum of regular items giving each person an 
RFS final score (range: -48 to 48).  Participants with scores below zero were coded as nonreli-
gious (n=50), those above zero were coded as religious (n=48), and those with scores of zero 
were not used in the analyses that follow (n=4).   
3.2.4 Manipulation Check 
Average accuracy was calculated for each word type (collapsed across all other varia-
bles), and then compared using a repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2,194)=18.92, p<.01, ηp2=.18.  
Consistent with Prediction 1, lexical decisions were significantly greater for religious (M=.97) 
and nonreligious words (M=.97) relative to nonwords (M=.92), ps<.01.  Overall, participants 
made highly accurate lexical decisions, and were accurate across conditions. 
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3.2.5 Primary Analyses 
A 2x2x2 [Participant Religiosity: religious, nonreligious x Picture Prime: religious, con-
trol x Word Type: religious, nonreligious] mixed-subjects ANOVA was conducted.  The de-
pendent variable was average RT to accurate lexical decisions.  A significant main effect of 
Word Type emerged, wherein participants were significantly faster to accurately identify reli-
gious (M=952.21 ms) than nonreligious (M=1034.30 ms) words, F(1,96)=21.37, p<.01, ηp2=.18.  
There was a significant Picture Prime x Word Type interaction as well, F(1,96)=8.55, p<.01, 
ηp
2
=.08.  Participants were faster to correctly identify a religious than nonreligious word when 
primed with a religious picture, t(97)= -5.13, p<.01.  The remaining pairwise comparisons were 
not significant, ps >.05.  See Figure 1. 
 
  
Figure 1. (Study 1) Picture Prime x Word Type interaction on average RT to accurate lexical de-
cisions. Error bars represent standard error. 
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3.2.1 Follow-up Analyses 
According to spreading activation theories (Collins & Loftus, 1975), RT to lexical deci-
sions should be faster at the end of the religious picture block than at the beginning.  Follow-up 
analyses confirm this expectation. Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to determine if there 
was activation build-up such that religious words at the end of the lexical task were identified 
faster than those at the beginning of the task.  For religious pictures, there was a significant de-
crease in RT for the last religious word (M=843.06 ms) versus the first religious word 
(M=1028.26 ms) presented, t(96)=3.00, p<.01.  This did not occur for control pictures.  The first 
and last religious word presented were identified equally as fast, p=.29.   
3.3 Discussion 
The intention for Study 1 was to determine whether religious pictures prime religious in-
formation in semantic memory, and furthermore whether this priming effect would be evident in 
all persons or only for participants with personally espoused religious beliefs.  The results sup-
ported Predictions 1 and 4.  Overall, participants (regardless of religious beliefs) were signifi-
cantly faster to make accurate lexical decisions to religious words than nonreligious words.  This 
suggests that religious words are salient rather than simply familiar, as religious and nonreligious 
words were pre-tested and found to be equally familiar.  Participants were also significantly fast-
er to identify religious than nonreligious words when primed with religious pictures   
First, these data demonstrate that religious words are salient to all persons possibly be-
cause over half the sample (60%) identified belonging to some faith tradition, and because the 
sample was gathered in the geographic ‘bible belt’ where Christian-based visual stimuli (e.g., 
churches, billboards) are common.  Second, spreading activation via picture presentation (as con-
firmed by follow-up analyses) influenced decision making.  Third, spreading activation from re-
23 
ligious pictures to religious information is ubiquitous as self-reported religious belief did not im-
pact lexical decisions.  This might have occurred because religious pictures and associated words 
are culturally ingrained, thus these semantic connections are developed for everyone living here 
in the south.  Furthermore, lexical decisions do not have a proscribed response based on religi-
osity, therefore even if activated with a religious picture; a person’s own belief system may not 
guide decisions under these circumstances. 
4     STUDY 2 – WORDS AS SYMBOLS ON LEXICAL DECISIONS 
In Study 2, concrete words were tested as primes to determine whether they had a compa-
rable or uniquely different influence than pictures on lexical decisions.  The imagery literature 
has demonstrated that when words are concrete (i.e., verbal labels of a physical object), then they 
encourage the same effect on an outcome (e.g., learning, memory) as if the object itself had been 
shown.  In the current study, participants completed the same priming and lexical decision trials 
as was conducted in Study 1, except that prime stimuli were no longer pictures, but were words 
that represented concrete objects.  As previous experiments have demonstrated that religious 
words prime religious outcomes (e.g., Wenger, 2003), religious words should similarly demon-
strate a priming effect here on lexical decisions.  However, pictures are predicted to serve a 
unique priming role as it has been found that RTs are fastest when a superordinate category (or 
concept) versus a related link in the semantic network is primed (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Thus, 
when compared to the data from Study 1, RTs to lexical decisions when primed with a concrete 
religious word should be slower.  There should be no difference in RTs as a result of concrete 
control words.  
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4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
Undergraduate students at GSU (N=104) were recruited for this study using the GSU 
Psychology Research, Testing and Tutoring site (http://gsu.sona-systems.com).  Participants self-
identified their gender (90 female, 14 male), race (22 White, 49 Black, 31 other race, 2 un-
known), age (range 18 - 31 years; M=19.51 years), and religion (69 Christian, 17 none/non-
denominational, 13 other religion, 5 agnostic/atheist).  Students voluntarily participated for 
course credit.   
4.1.2 Materials 
Word Primes. Sixty words or phrases (30 religious, 30 control; half of each concrete vs. 
abstract) were selected.  Ten of these were the verbal labels for pictures used in Study 1 (e.g., 
“crucifix”, “dove of peace”, “crown of thorns”).  The remaining words were pretested to be high-
ly religious (or not) – half of which were associated with a picture image (e.g., church, heaven, 
disciple).   
Words (Lexical Decision Task). See Materials; Pilot Study.  See also Appendix C. 
Religiosity. See Materials; Pilot Study. 
4.1.3 Procedure 
Participants followed the procedure conducted in Study 1 with the exception that words 
(religious, control) were used as the priming stimuli rather than pictures. 
25 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Items Analysis 
The presence of outliers was evaluated following criteria outlined in Study 1 (i.e., aver-
age RT and accuracy calculated for word primes, words used in the lexical task, and for each 
participant).  Three control word primes, one religious word prime, five nonwords, and three par-
ticipants were identified and removed from the dataset as they were beyond two standard devia-
tions of the mean.  The analyses that follow were conducted with all outliers removed. 
4.2.2 Data Preparation 
First, average RTs were calculated for each Word Prime x Concreteness x Word Type.  
Then, RFS scores were calculated for each participant (see Results; Study 1).  Those with a score 
below zero were coded nonreligious (n=45), those with a score above zero were coded religious 
(n=55), and those with a score of zero (n=1) were not included in the analyses that follow.   
4.2.3 Manipulation Check 
Average accuracy was calculated for each word type (collapsed across all other varia-
bles), and then compared using a repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2,200)=41.55, p<.01, ηp2=.29.  
Accurate lexical decisions were significantly greater for religious (M=.98) and nonreligious 
words (M=.98) relative to nonwords (M=.85), ps<.01.  Consistent with Study 1, participants 
made highly accurate lexical decisions overall, and across conditions.   
4.2.4 Primary Analyses 
First, a 2x2x2 [Participant Religiosity: religious, nonreligious x Word Prime (concrete 
only): religious, control x Word Type: religious, nonreligious] mixed-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted on accurate lexical decisions.  Similar to Study 1, a two-way interaction of Word 
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Prime x Word Type emerged as significant, F(1,98)=3.93, p=.05, ηp2=.04; however, the direction 
of means was not consistent with predictions (see Figure 2).  All participants were significantly 
faster to identify religious words when primed with a concrete control word than with a concrete 
religious word, t(100)=2.22, p=.03.  No other pairwise comparisons were significant.  Although 
not predicted, concrete religious word primes resulted in longer RTs to religious words relative 
to control word primes.   
Although previous research has demonstrated that conjuring an image associated with its 
verbal label takes time, thereby increasing RT (Paivio & O’Neill, 1970; Paivio & Csapo, 1969), 
this would not explain why concrete control words led to significantly faster priming of religious 
words.  The control words should have also conjured a mental image, requiring time to do so, 
just like the concrete religious words.  Therefore, priming should have occurred and in the ex-
pected direction unless priming did not occur from the presentation of concrete word primes.  To 
check this, paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare RT from the first to the last reli-
gious words identified in both the religious and control prime blocks.  For concrete religious 
word primes, RT decreased from the first to the last word confirming that spreading activation 
occurred from both religious word primes (Mfirst=1182.29 ms, Mlast=1024.78 ms, t(97)=2.07, 
p=.04).  When control words were primed, there was no change in RT from the first to last reli-
gious words, which suggests that concrete control word primes did not prime religious infor-
mation.   
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Figure 2. (Study 2) Word Prime (concrete) x Word Type interaction on average RT to accurate 
lexical decisions. Error bars represent standard error. 
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religious versus nonreligious words when primed with abstract religious words, t(100)= -3.95, 
p<.01, and slower to identify religious versus nonreligious words when primed with abstract con-
trol words, t(100)=2.91, p=.01.  Participants were also significantly slower to identify nonreli-
gious words when primed with religious versus control words, t(100)=5.35, p<.01.   
Paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare RT from the first to the last religious 
words identified in both the religious and control prime blocks.  Similar to the concrete word 
primes, for abstract religious word primes, RT decreased from the first to the last word confirm-
ing that spreading activation occurred from both religious word primes (Mfirst=1001.36, 
Mlast=805.44, t(99)=4.83, p<.01). Moreover, when compared across prime type, abstract religious 
words primed religious words faster than concrete religious words at the beginning, t(99)=2.46, 
p=.02, and end of the task, t(97)=5.95, p<.01.   Once again, when control words were the prime, 
there was no change in RT from the first to last religious words.   
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Figure 3. (Study 2) Word Prime (abstract) x Word Type interaction on average RT to accurate 
lexical decisions. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
To examine the unique effect of religious pictures versus concrete religious words on ac-
curate lexical decisions, a 2x2 [Prime: religious pictures (S1), concrete religious words (S2) x 
Word Type: religious, nonreligious] mixed-subjects ANOVA was conducted. First, a main effect 
of Word Type emerged, F(1,196)=7.26, p=.01, ηp2=.04.  Consistent with Study 1, participants 
were faster to identify religious (M=962.69 ms) than nonreligious (M=1013.72 ms) words.  Se-
cond, there was a two-way interaction of Prime x Word Type, F(1,196)=20.70, p<.01, ηp2=.10, 
see Figure 3.  Participants were significantly faster to identify religious versus nonreligious 
words when primed with a religious picture, t(97)= -5.13, p<.01.  There was no effect of concrete 
religious word primes on RT, p=.19.  Unexpectedly, RT did not differ based on Prime Type to 
either religious (p=.30) or nonreligious words (p=.12). 
  
Figure 4. (Study 2) Religious Prime x Word Type interaction on average RT to accurate lexical 
decisions. Error bars represent standard error. 
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4.3 Discussion 
As concrete words arguably conjure a mental image of the object they represent, Study 2 
tested whether concrete religious words would influence lexical decisions in a similar fashion to 
what was found in Study 1 where actual pictures were used as primes. Prediction 1 was not sup-
ported.  Participants took longer to identify religious words when primed with concrete religious 
(versus control) words - possibly suggesting that conjuring the mental image of a neutral con-
crete word occurs efficiently, whereas the same process for religious concrete words takes more 
time.  This could possibly occur because the concrete religious words are associated with verba-
tim memory traces (memories that involving conscious recollection; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) 
which may become activated along with other conceptual religious information.  Sifting through 
the contextual details of these memory traces may require more time to reach a decision on the 
lexical task at hand relative to when a concrete word conjures a neutral image with no associated 
verbatim traces.  
When RT was compared between Studies 1 and 2, partial support was found for the pre-
diction that religious pictures would prime related religious information faster than religious 
words.  Participants were faster to identify religious (versus nonreligious) words when primed 
with a religious picture, but not when primed with concrete religious words.  However, there was 
no difference in RT to religious words when primed with religious pictures versus concrete reli-
gious words.  Potentially, both pictures and concrete words (having conjured mental images) 
prime verbatim memory traces equally, which is why there is no difference in RT to religious 
words when picture versus concrete word primes are compared; however, because pictures en-
couraged faster RTs to religious than nonreligious words (whereas concrete religious word 
primes did not) this suggests that the visuo-spatial modality primarily employed via picture prim-
31 
ing resulted in quicker lexical decisions for the activated stimuli.  This is consistent with expecta-
tions via the picture superiority effect.  Because concrete words led to equal RT to religious and 
nonreligious words it is possible that the dual activation of visuo-spatial and phonological mo-
dalities resulted in an unexpected taxing of cognitive resources rendering priming across word 
type stimuli inconclusive. 
Additional possible explanations for the inconsistency in predictions and outcomes may 
come from limitations among the word stimuli.  Bleasdale (1987) suggested that different word 
types, from prime to target, could impact RT to the dependent task.  For example, concrete-
concrete and abstract-abstract word pairs lead to faster RT than mismatched (e.g., concrete-
abstract) pairs.  In Study 2, all of the lexical task words were abstract, whereas half the prime 
words were concrete and half were abstract.  This may account for some of the inconsistencies 
between predictions and outcomes; however, limitations within the experimental stimuli prevent 
full consideration of alternative theoretical accounts to explain these unexpected data.  These 
limitations include the prime words being subjectively selected and sorted into concrete and ab-
stract categories by the experimenter.  Although all words were pre-tested for valence, familiari-
ty, and spiritual-relatedness, they were not assessed for concreteness or imagability.  It is possi-
ble that concrete words were not as concrete, and abstract words not as abstract as they appeared.  
Similarly, it may be that the differences between the two word types were not statistically signif-
icant.   
In sum, these data demonstrate that religious pictures prime religious information by ac-
tivating related pathways that speeds RT to religious versus nonreligious words. Although fol-
low-up analyses of concrete religious word primes also demonstrated a priming effect on reli-
gious words throughout the duration of the religious priming block, the predicted comparisons 
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between prime and word type (i.e., concrete religious words should prime lexical decisions to 
religious words) did not emerge. Whereas previous studies found that concrete words influenced 
outcomes (e.g., memory for word pairs) similar to that of actual pictures, the current data do not 
support this finding.  Limitations related to the priming stimuli may prevent the comparable in-
fluence of pictures versus concrete words from being fully assessed.  Religious words do prime 
related religious words, but potentially the process to go from concrete word to mental image to 
lexical word identification (in Study 2) takes longer than to go from picture to lexical word iden-
tification (in Study 1).  Thus, the effect of priming with concrete words was eliminated due to 
this multi-step process resulting in pictures as primes having an advantage relative to concrete 
words in concept activation relative to concrete words.  
5     STUDY 3 – PICTURES AS SYMBOLS ON MORAL JUDGMENTS 
The motivation for Study 3 was such that the semantic pathway activation demonstrated 
in lexical decisions from Study 1 should then translate into moral judgments here in Study 3.  
The primary prediction was that religious pictures should prime semantic religious information 
which should then influence decisions in morally ambiguous action phrases.  Although Studies 1 
and 2 did not find any effect of participant religiosity on decisions, the decisions being made 
were nonmoral.  In Study 3, however, the primary task requires participants to decide the moral 
appropriateness of a stated behavior.  As faith-based guidelines are a reference for religious per-
sons when deciding how to act or what decision to make (e.g., “thou shalt not” type proscrip-
tions), if religious beliefs were to influence decision making, it would be most likely when mak-
ing a moral decision, and when primed with a religious picture.  Thus, for a religious person, see-
ing a religious picture might prime known behavioral expectations of one’s faith, thus leading to 
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a decrease in ratings of moral appropriateness.  If the effect of religious pictures is specific to 
moral decision making (versus other kinds of decisions, e.g., lexical), then nonreligious partici-
pants should not be influenced by the type of picture prime.   
5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
Undergraduate students at GSU (N=102) were recruited for this study using the GSU 
Psychology Research, Testing and Tutoring site (http://gsu.sona-systems.com).  Participants self-
identified their gender (72 female, 27 male, 3 participants did not answer this question), race (23 
White, 44 Black, 35 other race), age (range 18 - 54 years; M=23.69 years), and religion (51 
Christian, 29 none/non-denominational, 10 other religion, 8 agnostic/atheist, 4 participants did 
not answer this question).  Students voluntarily participated for course credit.   
5.1.2 Materials 
Pictures. See Materials; Pilot Study.  See also Appendix A. 
Religiosity.  See Materials; Pilot Study. 
Action Phrases.  Phrases were created based on the five themes of Moral Foundations 
Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004): sanctity/degradation, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, 
care/harm, authority/subversion.  Three examples were created for each of the five moral themes 
(n=15), and three versions of each phrase were created to reflect three categories of moral appro-
priateness (right, ambiguous, wrong) (n=45).  See Appendix D for a list of all phrases used.   
Phrases were then pre-tested by a panel of naïve raters (n=9), who viewed each phrase, 
and decided as quickly as possible if the behavior was right/wrong (Likert scale, 1= morally 
wrong, 7= morally right) as quickly as possible, and then rated how confident they were in their 
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decision (Likert scale: 1=not at all confident, 7=completely confident).  Average moral rating, 
average RT to moral ratings, and average confidence were calculated for each moral category 
(right, ambiguous, wrong).  Then three univariate ANOVAs were conducted with moral category 
as the independent variable.  First, average moral rating was examined, and was found to be sig-
nificant with differences in the expected directions, F(2,16)=142.54, ηp2=.95, p<.001, Phrases: 
Mright=5.99, Mambig=3.53, Mwrong=2.08.  All pairwise comparison were significant, ps<.001.  Mor-
ally right phrases were rated as most appropriate, morally wrong phrases were rates are least ap-
propriate, and morally ambiguous phrases were rated in between the right and wrong phrases.   
Next, average RT to moral ratings were compared, and found to be significant, 
F(2,16)=21.79, ηp2=.73, p<.001, Phrases: Mright=4601.65 ms, Mambig=6014.17 ms, 
Mwrong=4964.35 ms.  RT to the right and wrong phrases were significantly faster than to the am-
biguous phrases, ps<.01, but RT to right and wrong phrases were not significantly different from 
one another, p=.11.   Finally, ratings of confidence were compared, and the differences between 
ratings emerged significant as well, F(2,16)=13.66, ηp2=.63, p<.001, Phrases: Mright=6.70, 
Mambig=5.74, Mwrong=6.30.  Participants were significantly more confident to the right than the 
wrong (p=.05) phrases, and least confident to the ambiguous phrases.  All pairwise comparisons 
were significant.   
5.1.3 Procedure 
After reviewing and signing consent forms participants were presented with picture 
primes (religious, control) as described in Study 1.  After a picture was displayed, an action 
phrase (right, ambiguous, wrong) appeared and remained on screen until a moral decision (Likert 
scale: 1=morally wrong, 7=morally right) was made.  Participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly as possible.  Alternating pictures and action phrases were presented in two blocks, one 
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block for each picture prime (religious, control).  A total of fifteen trials (5 right, 5, ambiguous, 5 
wrong) were completed in each block, and each of the five (religious, control) pictures were 
shown three times in each block.  Trials were randomized.  Next, participants answered a series 
of questions related to their religiosity, and identified what they thought the experimental hy-
pothesis to be.  Finally, participants were debriefed and awarded credit for participating. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Manipulation Check 
Average Likert scale rating was calculated for each moral category (right, ambiguous, 
wrong).  Then a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to confirm the pilot data previously 
reported.  The effect was significant, F(2,194)=1134.56, p<.01, ηp2=.92.  Overall, ratings of mor-
al appropriateness were highest when morally right phrases (M=6.41) were shown versus moral-
ly ambiguous (M=3.74) or wrong (M=2.24) phrases.  All pairwise comparisons were significant, 
ps<.001. 
5.2.2 Data Preparation 
RFS scores were calculated for each participant.  Those with a score below zero were 
coded nonreligious (n=50), those with a score above zero were coded religious (n=48), and those 
with a score of zero (n=4) were not included in the analyses that follow.  Average Likert scale 
rating was then calculated for each moral category (right, ambiguous, wrong) by each picture 
prime (religious, control).   
5.2.3 Primary Analyses 
As there were a priori expectations specifically for ambiguous phrases, a 2x2 [Partici-
pants Religiosity: religious, nonreligious x Picture Prime: religious, control] mixed-subjects 
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ANOVA was conducted on average rating of moral appropriateness to ambiguous action phrases 
only.  A main effect of Picture Prime emerged, F(1,96)=5.52, p=.02, ηp2=.05.  Participants pro-
vided lower ratings of moral appropriateness when primed with a religious (M=3.81) than control 
(M=4.09) picture.  A two-way Participant Religiosity x Picture Prime interaction was also signif-
icant, F(1,96)=4.17, p=.04, ηp2=.04, see Figure 5.  Religious participants provided lower moral 
ratings when primed with a religious than control picture, t(47)= -2.91, p=01.  No other pairwise 
comparisons were significant. 
  
Figure 5. (Study 3) Participant Religiosity x Picture Prime interaction on average rating of moral 
appropriateness to ambiguous action phrases. Error bars represent standard error. 
5.3 Discussion 
In Study 3, it was predicted that religious pictures would influence moral judgments pri-
marily for religious participants, and the current data support this expectation.  When judging 
morally ambiguous actions, ratings of moral appropriateness decreased when primed with reli-
gious (relative to control) pictures.  This effect occurred for everyone regardless of self-reported 
religious beliefs. However, when the influence on Picture Prime was examined in conjunction 
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with personal religiosity, then only the religious participants displayed this pattern.   These data 
suggest that uncertain, or ambiguous, circumstances led to a reliance of known faith-based tenets 
of behavior (e.g., “thou shalt not”), but only when religious information was activated via Picture 
Prime.   Although Studies 1 and 2 did not find any influence of participant religiosity on decision 
making, the current data suggest that applying religion beliefs during decision deliberation 
emerges when considering moral situations. 
6     STUDY 4 – WORDS AS SYMBOLS ON MORAL JUDGMENTS 
The intent of Study 4 was to determine whether priming with religious words would in-
fluence moral judgments in the same direction as religious picture primes did in Study 3.  Here, 
concrete religious words were used (see Study 2), and moral assessments were made on morally 
right, ambiguous, and wrong action phrases (see Study 3).   
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants 
Undergraduate students at GSU (N=104) were recruited for this study using the GSU 
Psychology Research, Testing and Tutoring site (http://gsu.sona-systems.com).  Participants self-
identified their gender (90 female, 14 male), race (22 White, 49 Black, 31 other race, 2 un-
known), age (range 18 - 31 years; M=19.51 years), and religion (69 Christian, 17 none/non-
denominational, 13 other religion, 5 agnostic/atheist).  Students voluntarily participated for 
course credit.   
6.1.2 Materials 
Word Primes. See Materials; Study 3. See also Appendix C. 
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Religiosity.  See Materials; Pilot Study. 
Action Phrases.  See Materials; Study 3.  See also Appendix D. 
6.1.3 Procedure 
Participants followed the procedure conducted in Study 2 with the exception that words 
(religious, control; concrete, abstract) were used as the priming stimuli rather than pictures. 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 Manipulation Check 
Average Likert scale rating was calculated for each moral category (right, ambiguous, 
wrong).  Then a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to confirm the pilot data reported in 
Study 3.  The difference was significant, F(2,206)=872.19, p<.01, ηp2=.89.  Overall, ratings of 
moral appropriateness were highest when morally right phrases (M=6.35) were shown versus 
morally ambiguous (M=3.77) and wrong (M=2.35) phrases.  All pairwise comparisons were sig-
nificant, ps<.001. 
6.2.2 Data Preparation 
RFS scores were calculated for each participant.  Those with a score below zero were 
coded nonreligious (n=58), those with a score above zero were coded religious (n=45), and those 
with a score of zero (n=1) were not included in the analyses that follow.  Average Likert scale 
ratings for word primes (religious, concrete) were calculated for ambiguous phrases only.   
6.2.3 Primary Analyses 
A 2x2 [Word Prime (concrete): religious, control x Participant Religiosity: religious, 
nonreligious] mixed subjects ANOVA was conducted on ambiguous action phrases only.  Only a 
main effect of Word Prime was significant, F(1,101)=8.00, p=.01, ηp2=.07, such that concrete 
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religious words encouraged lower ratings of moral appropriateness (M=3.97) relative to concrete 
control words (M=4.38) for everyone, independent of personal religiosity.  No other differences 
were found to be significant. 
Finally, to determine the unique influence of religious pictures on moral decision making, 
a 2x2x2 [Symbol: pictures (S3), concrete words (S4) x Prime: religious, control x Participants 
Religiosity: religious, nonreligious] mixed subjects ANOVA was run on ambiguous action 
phrases.  A significant main effect of Prime emerged, F(1,197)=13.39, p<.01, ηp2=.06.  Partici-
pants provided lower moral ratings when primed with a religious (M=3.89) than a control 
(M=4.23) symbol.  Furthermore, there was a trending main effect of Symbol, F(1,197)=3.59, 
p=.06, ηp2=.02, such that the religious pictures from Study 3 (M=3.95) encouraged lower moral 
ratings than religious words from Study 4 (M=4.18). 
6.3 Discussion 
The purpose of Study 4 was to determine whether religious words would elicit a priming 
effect when deliberating on an uncertain situation, thus leading to lower ratings of moral appro-
priateness, and further to examine whether this effect was more pronounced for religious than 
nonreligious participants.  These predictions were supported by the data in Study 3, and were 
only partially supported in Study 4.  In the current study, there was significant priming effect of 
religious (relative to control) words, whereby ratings of moral appropriateness to ambiguous ac-
tions dropped when primed with a religious word.  Unlike Study 3, this effect was independent 
of participant religiosity.  Moreover, when Studies 3 and 4 were compared, two effects emerged.  
First, any religious symbol (picture or word) primed moral decisions – that is, ratings were lower 
when primed with a religious than a control symbol.  Second, religious pictures encouraged low-
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er ratings in moral decisions that religious words.  Once again, these effects were independent of 
participant religiosity. 
Unlike Study 3 where religious (versus control) pictures encouraged lower ratings of 
moral appropriateness for religious participants, Study 4 provides further evidence for a general 
priming influence of religious symbols, regardless of individual religious beliefs (as demonstrat-
ed in Studies 1 and 2). That differences in moral decisions as a function of individual religiosity 
only became evident when comparing religious to control pictures (in Study 3) may speak to the 
salience of the pictures themselves, as well as to the nature of pictures as symbols - meaning that 
images do not represent one individual idea or tenet, but rather are symbolic of multiple related 
facets, thus leading to a more pronounced priming effect than words alone. 
7     GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1 Review of experimental findings 
Four experiments were used to examine the distinct influence of religious pictures on de-
cision making.  In Study 1, participants viewed religious and neutral (control) pictures, and then 
made a series of lexical decisions.  In Study 2, participants viewed religious and neutral words 
(which represented the pictures viewed in Study 1), and then made lexical decisions.  In Studies 
3 and 4, participants made decisions about moral actions.  Moral decisions were preceded by 
viewing pictures in Study 3, and by words in Study 4.  It was overall hypothesized that religious 
pictures would encourage a priming effect, via spreading activation, on decision making (lexical, 
moral) relative to when control pictures were presented, and relative to when religious words 
were presented.  Partial support for this hypothesis was found.  In Study 1, all participants made 
faster lexical decisions to religious words when primed with a religious picture.  In Study 2, ab-
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stract (but not concrete) religious words primed lexical decisions to religious items in the pre-
dicted direction.  It was further anticipated that individual religious beliefs would interact with 
the type of symbol presented, thus influencing decision making.  Support for this prediction was 
only demonstrated for moral decisions in Study 3, whereas highly religious participants rated 
ambiguous actions as less morally appropriate when primed with a religious versus control pic-
ture.  However, in Study 4, the effect of participant religiosity did not emerge when primed with 
religious words.  Instead, there was an overall tendency to make lower moral ratings when 
primed with a religious versus control word, and lower ratings when primed with a religious pic-
ture versus a religious word.  That these effects emerged for everyone, and not as a function of 
participant religiosity suggests the pervasiveness of religious knowledge, and its influence on 
decision making. 
Thus, it can be concluded that religious iconography consistently primes religious infor-
mation, thereby leading to quick and accurate decision making.  Furthermore, when presented 
with a moral situation, religious pictures (presumably having primed semantically related reli-
gious information) encourage decisions consistent with known faith-based tenets.  This interac-
tive effect is most influential when individual religious beliefs are held.   
7.2 Moral Decision Making 
7.2.1 Religion 
As our memory is adaptive (such that non-useful information is often forgotten or dis-
carded), but also fallible (such that necessary information may not be accessible; Schacter, 
1999), religious pictures cue stored semantic knowledge of religion, which includes expectations 
of normative behavior (Guthrie, 1996).  Indeed, when participants in the current set of studies 
saw religious pictures they adjusted moral judgments in line with religious expectations of mo-
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rality.  Other studies looking at the influence of religious pictures have used pictures of the Pope, 
Christ, or a demon, and found that presentation of those pictures influence physiological re-
sponses (Weisbuch-Remington, et al., 2005), and perceptions of self (Baldwin, et al., 1990), but 
none have directly looked at how religious pictures influence decision making, and specifically 
moral decision making.   
Previous researchers who examined the relationship between religion and morality have 
primarily used word as primes.  For example, priming with religious words has been found to 
increase generosity and cooperation (Ahmed & Salas, 2011; Shariff & Norenzana, 2007) and in-
crease honesty in a cheating task (Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007).  In the current studies, prim-
ing with religious words increased access to related religious information (evidenced by faster 
RT; Study 2, but only for abstract primes), and led to decreased assessments of moral appropri-
ateness of ambiguous actions (Study 4).  Future studies could examine if the influence of reli-
gious pictures versus words would extend beyond decision making and onto a specific moral be-
havior. 
7.2.2 Religious Beliefs 
Although some previous demonstrations of religious priming on moral outcomes have 
found individual religious beliefs influential (e.g., Cohen & Rozin, 2001), others have not (e.g., 
Lombrozo, 2009).  The current studies offer support for both sides of this debate.  In Study 3, 
moral appropriateness dropped when religious pictures were shown.  Although this was demon-
strated regardless of individual religiosity it was amplified for religious participants.  However, 
in Study 4, when words were used as primes, the effect of religious versus control primes were 
consistently influential on moral decisions, but the moderating impact of personal religiosity was 
not replicated from the previous experiment.   
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According to the literature, two factors appear prominent when cataloguing the effect of 
religiosity: type of prime, and type of religious assessment.  First, when religious words have 
been used as primes, participant religiosity has not influenced moral outcomes (e.g., Ahmed & 
Salas, 2011; Randolph-Seng & Nielson, 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).  When no prime 
was used in a moral judgment task, then personal religiosity influenced decisions (Cohen & 
Rozin, 2001).  When religious pictures were used as primes in a nonmoral judgment task, (Bald-
win, et al. 1990; Weisbuch-Remington, 2005), then personal religiosity mattered.  Second, be-
cause religion is difficult to define based on its highly subjective nature, it is also difficult to as-
sess.  Some studies have assessed religion based on denomination and found that it does not in-
fluence moral outcomes (Fumagalli, et al, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).  One study found 
that denomination influenced moral judgments (Weisbuch-Remington, 2005), but the prime 
types of the former and latter studies varied.  Others have found influences of fundamental-
ist/dogmatic beliefs (defined as orthodoxy, or the degree to which a person believes there is one 
foundational set of teachings about all human truths; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) 
(Morewedge & Clear, 2008; Wahrman, 1981), and still others have looked at subjective assess-
ment of religious practice (Baldwin, et al. 1990).   
The current experiments looked at both factors: the influence of prime type and religious 
assessment on moral decisions.  Here, both prime types (pictures and words) activated religious 
information (Studies 1 and 2), and influenced moral decisions (Studies 3 and 4), although reli-
gious pictures seemed to encourage these outcomes to a greater degree than words.  Moreover, 
only the fundamental beliefs assessment (RFS; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) resulted in an 
interactive effect on moral decisions in Study 3.  Assessments of religious behavior and denomi-
nation did not yield any significant results (see Footnote 1, p. 22).  Taken together with previous 
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research, the current data provide further evidence that religious beliefs do not influence moral 
outcomes when words are used as primes.  They do influence these outcomes when pictures are 
used as primes, but by assessing religion as fundamentalism, rather than on denomination or fre-
quency of faith practices.   
Why might this be?  Winchester (2008) argued that one’s moral identity is shaped by re-
ligious beliefs and faith-based ritual behavior.  This may be particularly true for people with a 
fundamentalist perspective of their faith – the perspective that influenced moral decisions in the 
current studies.  Therefore, a salient visual icon of one’s faith (the foundation of understanding 
humanity, and the source of a person’s moral identity) likely has a significant impact on deci-
sions made after viewing the picture.  For the nonreligious person, morality is not bound up in 
any faith tradition, therefore deciding the moral appropriateness of an uncertain action should not 
have the dissonant influence on cognition that it might have had for religious participants.  But 
the fact that these participants also made moral choices in the same direction as religious partici-
pants, that is the tendency to say ‘wrong’, suggests that activated religious information and along 
with it behavioral expectations of morality were the motivation for these decisions. This is fur-
ther supported by the widespread awareness of what these icons represent, coupled with their 
general salience in the geographic region where the current studies were conducted (i.e., the “Bi-
ble belt”).  It follows then that all participants were influenced by these religious icons, but those 
most strongly affected with those with a fundamentalist faith. 
An area of future research would be to evaluate the strength of religious beliefs in an al-
ternative manner, and then to measure moral decisions.  According to Hill’s (1994) attitude pro-
cess model, the strength of an attitude should be demonstrated in an automatic versus controlled 
task.  Thus, participants could be cognitive loaded (meaning that internal cognitive processing 
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resources, i.e., working memory capacity, would be taxed) or not, and then participants would 
make moral decisions after being primed with religious pictures.  Religious (versus nonreligious) 
participants should express their religious beliefs via harsher ratings to morally ambiguous ac-
tions when cognitively loaded (than when not loaded). 
7.2.3 Imagery 
The literature on imagery and moral decision making is small but growing.  Amit and 
Greene (2012) found that engaging visual imagery during moral deliberation led to deontological 
(behavior-focused) decisions to trolley-type scenarios.  This led the authors to conclude that 
when behaviors and outcomes are in conflict (as they are in trolley-type scenarios), then the 
greater good is sacrificed, meaning that participants opt to refrain from action (doing nothing 
which leads to the death of five people), rather than taking action (killing one person in order to 
save five others).  This may be because moral deliberation is a more salient process if coupled 
with visual imagery (Caruso & Gino, 2011).  Thus, when told to visualize the events in the sce-
nario, and you are the person doing the pushing (and inevitably the killing), then the choice 
which keeps you from carrying out what you have just imagined is selected (i.e., the deontologi-
cal choice).   
It has recently been demonstrated that religious people tend to make more deontological 
choices when presented with moral scenarios (Banerjee, Huebner, & Hauser, 2010).  Given the 
history and focus of appropriate behavior (via ten commandments, for example) it follows that 
participants with affirmed religious beliefs find it difficult to transgress even if the outcome of 
transgressing leads to benefits (i.e., saved lives) for the greatest number of people.  Although the 
Amit and Greene (2012) study did not assess religious belief among participants, and the 
Banerjee and colleagues (2010) study did not include a visual imagery manipulation, taken to-
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gether, there are implications for the current and future studies.  The current studies found that 
visual pictures influenced moral decisions, possibly because of the salience of the visual modali-
ty as argued by Caruso and Gino (2011).  The current studies did not use trolley-type scenarios to 
assess moral decisions, although future studies could assess the influence of using pictures on 
moral decisions for situations that include more contextual information than the behaviors in 
Studies 3 and 4 of the current paper.   
7.3 Priming 
Although spreading activation was the theoretical foundation for the predicted priming ef-
fects, the current studies did not directly test the superiority of spreading activation over non-
spreading activation theories.  Spreading activation states that priming occurs as a result of the 
facilitation of activity from one semantically related node to another, whereas non-spreading ac-
tivation (e.g., Dosher & Rosedale, 1989) states that priming is the result of the familiarity of spe-
cific paired associations. In the current studies, type of prime (religious, control) were presented 
in block format, such that participants were primed with the same category of symbol over and 
over again until all trials within the block were complete.  Spreading activation accounts suggest 
that repeated exposure to a prime stimulus leads to accumulation of activation at related semantic 
nodes (Collins & Loftus, 1975).  It follows then that, in regard to the current studies, RT to accu-
rate lexical decisions of religious words should be faster by the end of the religious picture block 
than at the beginning.  Conversely, non-spreading activation accounts suggest an action-
potential-type priming effect such that each time a prime is presented the effect of the prime 
reaches a standard capacity which cannot be exceeded.  Thus, even repeated exposure to similar 
prime categories would not influence RT across the duration of the trial set (Dosher & Rosedale, 
1989; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988).  Follow up analyses from Study 1 confirm the former account 
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– priming of religious pictures spread and accumulated at associated links thereby leading to 
faster responses at the end of the prime block.   
Although the data from Study 2 did not fully confirm predictions, this may have occurred 
because spread of activation did not occur in the same way that was demonstrated in Study 1 
with religious pictures.  The same follow-up analyses run on Study 1 were run on Study 2, and 
showed that in fact priming did occur for both concrete and abstract religious word primes (but 
not control word primes).  Evidence for priming, but lack of evidence for priming in the expected 
directions may relate to the limitations of the stimuli used.  First, free association from pictures 
to words was not conducted, but could be done in future experiments.  Second, religious and 
nonreligious words used as prime stimuli were not pre-tested for concreteness, and therefore 
were not calibrated for factor, but rather were subjectively chosen by the experimenter.  Future 
studies should remedy this by pre-testing all words (prime stimuli and words used in the lexical 
task) for concreteness (along with other pre-test measures gathered in the current studies, that are 
valence, familiarity, spiritual-relatedness).   
Furthermore, spreading and non-spreading activation theories should respond differently 
if a mediated stimulus was introduced between prime and target item.  Thus, future studies could 
test which theory accounts for the priming effect demonstrated here by introducing a second lex-
ical word in a trial set.  For example, a prime (religious picture) could be presented, followed by 
a mediating word or nonword presented for lexical judgment, followed by the target religious 
word for lexical judgment.  If priming occurred regardless of the mediating prime then spreading 
activation is evident.  If priming is reduced then this provides evidence for non-spreading activa-
tion (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992).  Conversely, a second, and unrelated, picture could be shown 
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between the primary prime cue (i.e., religious picture) and the target religious word.  Again, if 
priming occurred then spreading activation accounts would be supported. 
7.4 Conclusions 
The overarching goal of the current experiments was to examine the controversial and in-
consistently linked relationship between religion and moral decision making.  Four specific re-
search aims were tested: 1) To determine whether presentation of religious pictures would facili-
tate identification of related items (religious words), 2) To determine whether the verbal labels of 
religious pictures would lead to the predicted facilitation referenced in Aim 1, 3) To determine 
whether presentation of religious pictures would facilitate moral judgments consistent with 
known religion-based expectations of morality, and 4) To determine whether individual religious 
beliefs moderate the relationship between picture (or word) prime and decision outcome (lexical 
or moral) outlined in the aforementioned aims.  In sum, these data demonstrate that religious pic-
tures prime religious information and guide moral decisions.  This priming effect is more pro-
nounced for self-reported religious than nonreligious persons.   
Future research should replicate these data, and could possibly extend the breadth of in-
fluence religious pictures have (from moral decisions to actual behavior).  Additionally, it may 
also be that the relationship between icons (associated with normative moral behavior) and moral 
decisions extend beyond religious icons exclusively.  Other pictures, as demonstrated by 
Broeders and colleagues (2011), may also be iconic (and therefore encouraging) of moral deci-
sions/behaviors. Thus, future researchers could identify a catalog of other pictures which repre-
sent moral expectations.  Doing so could have implications for moral education in faith-based or 
school-based settings, as well as in correctional facilities where boundaries of socially normative 
behavior have been violated.    
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Appendix A 
Table 1. (Study 1, 3) Pictures used as primes
PICTURE PICTURE TYPE 
 
Religious 
 
Religious 
 
Religious 
 
Religious 
 
Religious 
@@@@@ Control 
##### Control 
%%%%% Control 
^^^^^ Control 
***** Control 
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AVG. RELIGIOSITY AVG. VALENCE AVG
6.64 6.00 
6.14 5.50 
6.07 6.21 
5.86 6.00 
5.71 3.14 
1.60 4.40 
1.60 4.40 
1.60 4.40 
1.60 4.00 
1.60 3.80 
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. FAMILIARITY 
6.86 
6.07 
6.79 
6.71 
5.93 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
4.40 
7.00 
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Appendix B 
Table 2. (Study 1, 2) Words used in the lexical decision task 
WORD WORD TYPE 
Adterie Nonword 
Accord Religious 
Accuracy Nonreligious 
Alike Nonreligious 
Artistic Nonreligious 
Belff Nonword 
Benevolence Religious 
Bless Religious 
Caring Nonreligious 
Cherish Religious 
Civilized Nonreligious 
Communion Religious 
Compassion Religious 
Compliments Nonreligious 
Dawpishness Nonword 
Decency Religious 
Declare Religious 
Drerm Nonword 
Elstown Nonword 
Encourages Nonreligious 
Endurance Religious 
Faithful Religious 
Fitness Nonreligious 
Froozation Nonword 
Gheen Nonword 
Goodness Religious 
Harmony Religious 
Improving Nonreligious 
Insights Nonreligious 
Kindness Religious 
  
WORD WORD TYPE 
Marvelous Nonreligious 
Mastery Nonreligious 
Mercy Religious 
Mongerate Nonword 
Peace Religious 
Phoycener Nonword 
Pleath Nonword 
Poised Nonreligious 
Purity Religious 
Rejoice Religious 
Restraint Religious 
Scapps Nonword 
Scirely Nonword 
Serkern Nonword 
Smiling nonreligious 
Swarlers Nonword 
Sympathy Religious 
Tabirsch Nonword 
Table Nonreligious 
Terrific Nonreligious 
Thrived Nonreligious 
Timely Nonreligious 
Treastle Nonword 
Tunceness Nonword 
Valiant Nonreligious 
Vawlerly Nonword 
Wherlor Nonword 
Whertish Nonword 
Worship Religious 
Youthful nonreligious 
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Appendix C 
Table 3. (Study 2, 4) Words used as primes 
[Note: * Words that represent pictures presented as primes in Studies 2 and 4. ** Words that 
were not used in Study 4] 
 
 WORD PRIME RELIGIOSITY CONCRETE/ABSTRACT 
** Blemin Control Abstract 
** cubble Control Abstract 
** Danter Control Abstract 
** Flazik Control Abstract 
** Gastan Control Abstract 
** Lactain Control Abstract 
** Puxil Control Abstract 
 Corple Control Abstract 
 Daver Control Abstract 
 Nucade Control Abstract 
 Ompost Control Abstract 
 Roaken Control Abstract 
 Sarlin Control Abstract 
 Vorgo Control Abstract 
 Yertan Control Abstract 
** Delight Religious Abstract 
** Ethical Religious Abstract 
** Gospel Religious Abstract 
** Grace Religious Abstract 
** Integrity Religious Abstract 
** Morals Religious Abstract 
** Righteousness Religious Abstract 
** Saved Religious Abstract 
 Amen Religious Abstract 
 Fellowship Religious Abstract 
 Forgiveness Religious Abstract 
 Holy Religious Abstract 
 Hospitality Religious Abstract 
 Salvation Religious Abstract 
 Self-control Religious Abstract 
* Asterisk Control Concrete 
* At sign Control Concrete 
* Insert/caret Control Concrete 
* Number sign Control Concrete 
* Percent sign Control Concrete 
70 
** Ampersand Control Concrete 
** Backslash Control Concrete 
** Comma Control Concrete 
** Dash sign Control Concrete 
** Minus sign Control Concrete 
** Plus sign Control Concrete 
** Question mark Control Concrete 
 Apostrophe Control Concrete 
 Parentheses Control Concrete 
 Semicolon Control Concrete 
* Christian fish Religious Concrete 
* Crown of thorns Religious Concrete 
* Crucifix Religious Concrete 
* Dove of peace Religious Concrete 
* Eucharist/communion Religious Concrete 
** Baptism Religious Concrete 
** Disciple Religious Concrete 
** Heaven Religious Concrete 
** Pulpit Religious Concrete 
** Resurrection Religious Concrete 
** Saint Religious Concrete 
** Sermon Religious Concrete 
 Church Religious Concrete 
 Jesus Religious Concrete 
 Pastor Religious Concrete 
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Appendix D   
Table 4. (Study 3, 4)  Action phrases used in the moral judgment task 
[Note:  Values listed to the right of each phrase are average ratings of moral appropriateness 
(1=morally wrong, 7=morally right)] 
  
THEME MORALLY RIGHT MORALLY AMBIGUOUS MORALLY WRONG 
Sanctity/ 
Degredation: 
Decency 
Having sex with 
your committed 
partner 
5.78 Having sex with 
a friend 
3.89 Having sex with 
a biological fam-
ily member 
1.22 
 
 
 
Sanctity/ 
Degredation: 
Disgust 
Eating uncon-
taminated food 
on your plate 
4.33 Eating food a 
cockroach 
walked past but 
did not touch 
5.33 Eating food a 
cockroach has 
just walked 
across 
4.56 
 
 
 
 
Sanctity/ 
Degredation: 
God 
Helping to paint 
church walls 
with words of 
hope 
6.33 
 
Walking past 
others marking 
up church walls 
2.89 Painting church 
walls with hate 
speech 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
Fairness/ 
Cheating: 
Stealing 
Finding a wallet 
and returning it 
7.00 Finding a wallet 
and taking the 
cash inside 
2.11 Stealing some-
one’s wallet 
1.11 
 
 
 
Fairness/ 
Cheating: 
Lying 
Honestly stating 
your work expe-
rience on your 
resume 
7.00 Embellishing 
your work expe-
rience on your 
resume 
3.22 Boosting your 
resume with ex-
perience you’ve 
never had 
2.11 
 
 
 
 
Fairness/ 
Cheating: 
Bully 
Befriending 
everyone – even 
the least popular 
kids in school 
5.78 
 
Avoiding, but 
not directly pick-
ing on, the least 
popular kids in 
school 
3.11 Repeatedly pick-
ing on the least 
popular kids in 
your school 
1.78 
 
 
 
 
 
Loyalty/ 
Betrayal: 
Betrayal 
Defending a 
classmate who 
is being verbal-
ly abused 
6.56 
 
Staying silent 
while a class-
mate gets verbal-
ly abused 
1.89 Joining in to 
verbally abuse a 
classmate of 
yours 
2.11 
 
 
 
 
Loyalty/ 
Betrayal: 
Infidelity 
Remaining hon-
est with your 
spouse 
6.56 Lying to your 
abusive spouse 
3.56 Lying to your 
spouse 
1.67 
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Loyalty/ 
Betrayal:  
Patriotism 
Displaying the 
flag of your 
home country 
6.44 Displaying the 
flag of another 
country 
5.00 Burning the flag 
of your home 
country 
2.00 
 
 
 
Care/Harm: 
Vulnerable 
Offering to help 
a homeless per-
son in need 
5.67 Pretending you 
don’t see a 
homeless person 
who needs help 
3.33 Aggressively 
refusing to help a 
homeless person 
in need 
2.33 
 
 
 
 
Care/Harm: 
Suffer 
Comforting a 
friend after their 
spouse passes 
away 
6.33 Being unable to 
comfort a griev-
ing friend 
4.33 Repeatedly re-
minding a friend 
that their spouse 
is dead 
1.67 
 
 
 
 
Care/Harm: 
Cruel 
Humanely kill-
ing a deer and 
eating the meat 
3.89 
 
Accidentally 
killing a deer 
with your car 
3.22 Watching a deer 
slowly suffer and 
die 
1.44 
 
 
 
Authority/ 
Subversion: 
Respect 
Respecting your 
mother 
6.67 Screening calls 
from your moth-
er 
3.56 Telling your 
mother to “go to 
hell” 
2.78 
 
 
 
Authority/ 
Subversion: 
Tradition 
Voting in a 
presidential 
election 
6.44 Forgetting to 
vote in a presi-
dential election 
4.11 Refusing to vote 
in a presidential 
election 
3.44 
 
 
 
Authority/ 
Subversion: 
Chaos 
Signing a peti-
tion against a 
corrupt business 
5.00 Disrupting a 
business with a 
flashmob 
3.44 Breaking win-
dows of a cor-
rupt business 
2.00 
 
 
 
AVERAGE  5.99  3.53  2.08 
 
 
